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Abstract 
If investors are not fully rational, what can smart money do? This paper provides an 
example in which smart money can strategically take advantage of investors’ behavioral 
biases and manipulate the price process to make profit. The paper considers three types of 
traders, behavior-driven investors who have two behavioral biases (momentum trading 
and dispositional effect), arbitrageurs, and a manipulator who can influence asset prices. 
We show that, due to the investors’ behavioral biases and the limit of arbitrage, the 
manipulator can profit from a “pump and dump” trading strategy by accumulating the 
speculative asset while pushing the asset price up, and then selling the asset at high prices. 
Since nobody has private information, manipulation investigated here is completely 
trade-based. The paper also endogenously derives several asset pricing anomalies, 
including the high volatility of asset prices, momentum and reversal. 
JEL: G12, G18
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Behavioral studies in economics and finance, such as Kahneman and Tversky (1974, 
1979, 2000), Tversky and Kahneman (1986), Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), 
Thaler (1999), suggest that economic agents are less than fully rational1. They are often 
psychologically biased. Their psychological biases, together with “limits of arbitrage”, 
lead to asset price’ deviations from fundamental values and may generate a large number 
of anomalies that cannot be easily explained in the rational expectations paradigm. 
 
While it is important to identify plausible causes for asset pricing anomalies, most 
investors would be more interested in knowing how to take advantage of other people’s 
behavioral biases to make money. In this paper, we build an equilibrium model to 
demonstrate how “smart money” can profit from other investors’ irrational behaviors. 
The model has three classes of investors: a manipulator, behavior-driven investors, and 
arbitrageurs. Behavior-driven investors are not fully rational, whose behavioral biases 
used in the model are momentum trading and unwillingness to sell losers. These two 
psychological biases are supported by many theoretical and empirical studies, including 
Hong and Stein (1999), Odean (1998), Shefrin and Statman (1985), among others. 
  
Arbitrageurs play a critical role in preventing large price jumps and market crash, but 
because of the limits of arbitrage, they cannot fully eliminate asset price’s deviation from 
fundamental value.  
 
The manipulator is a large investor who is a price setter rather than a price taker. As a 
deep-pocket investor, he lures momentum investors into the market by pumping up the 
stock price and then dumps the stock to make a profit by taking advantage of the 
disposition effect and the limits of arbitrage. 
 
                                                        
1 Barberis and Thaler (2003) and Hirshleifer (2001) provide detailed surveys of the behavior 
literature. 
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Numerous empirical studies suggest that there exist trading strategies that can yield 
positive abnormal returns presumably because of asset pricing errors. For example, 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) report that investors can make substantial abnormal profits 
by buying past winners and selling past losers2. These studies have several common 
characteristics. First, they are based all on observed or realized prices. Naturally, the 
realized prices are the result of interactions among a large number of investors. Therefore, 
it is difficult to rely only on the empirical studies to identify the roles played by different 
investors in price determination. Second, the trading strategies such as the momentum 
trading documented in the empirical literature usually takes the price process as 
exogenous. This methodology is valid only if the investors who follow these strategies, in 
total, are price-takers.  Investors cannot actively affect price processes for profit-making 
purpose.  
 
A distinctive feature of our model is its explicit investigation of how smart money (the 
manipulator) interacts with irrational traders and what profit the manipulator makes from 
exploiting other investors’ behavioral biases. In other words, the manipulator in our 
model manipulates the price process to create more chances for the irrational investors to 
make mistakes. This is an important feature, but largely assumed away in the existing 
behavioral finance literature. For instance, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998, BSV 
henceforth) have a representative agent model in which trading does not occur. Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998, DHS henceforth) consider two classes of traders, 
the informed (I) and the uninformed (U). However, since prices in their model are set by 
the risk-neutral informed traders, the formal role of the uninformed is minimal there. 
Hong and Stein also model two classes of traders--news-watchers and momentum traders. 
News-watchers only care about what news they observe, while momentum traders make 
                                                        
2 Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2003) argue that the profit of the momentum strategy documented 
by Jegadeesh and Titman is illusory because of transactions costs. Lesmond, Schill and Zhou’s 
result therefore provides positive evidence for the argument of “limits of arbitrage.” 
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decisions based only on price changes. No trader purposefully chooses a trading strategy 
to take advantage of other people’s behavioral biases.  
 
Moreover, the price movement in our model is completely trade based. It neither resorts 
to information asymmetry nor depends on the fundamental risk of the asset. Almost all 
other behavior-based asset pricing theories, however, depend on fundamental-related 
information or news in some ways. As we will discuss subsequently, this feature allows 
us to investigate purely trade based market manipulation. 
 
Finally, our model produces somewhat similar correlations among prices, turnover, and 
volatility to the model of investor overconfidence by Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). In 
our model, the manipulator’s strategic action, together with other investors’ behavioral 
biases, not only brings the manipulator himself profit, but also brings about excess 
volatility, excess trading, short-term price continuation, and long-term price reversal. This 
feature helps us to further understand why investors trade and why asset prices 
sometimes fluctuate continually without any significant news on earnings and other 
fundamental variables. It also provides a purely trade-based explanation on some well 
known empirical anomalies, such as price momentum and reversal. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature of 
manipulation. Section 2 sets up the theoretical model. Section 3 solves the model for the  
“pump and dump” strategy and then extends the model to include the “dump and cover” 
strategy.. Section 4 investigates the implications of the model on several well-known 
asset pricing anomalies. Section 5 provides some empirical evidence from recent studies 
of market manipulation that is consistent with our model. Section 6 concludes. 
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1. A Review of the Manipulation Literature 
 
Market manipulation is an issue that is almost as old as the earliest speculative market. 
The prevalence of “pump and dump” or “dump and cover” strategies was widely reported 
in financial press at the beginning of the 17th century when the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange was founded. Even though market manipulation might be much more severe in 
the early years of financial markets, it is too early to say that manipulation is no longer of 
importance. In modern financial markets, manipulations are often taken in hidden ways 
that cannot be easily detected and outlawed. In many emerging markets where market 
regulations are weak, manipulation is still quite rampant.3 Even in the relatively well- 
regulated US market, Aggarwal and Wu (2003) have documented hundreds of cases of price 
manipulation in the 1990s. . 
 
Following Allen and Gale (1992), we classify manipulation into three categories: 
information-based manipulation, action-based manipulation, and trade-based 
manipulation.  
 
Information-based manipulation is taken by releasing false information or spreading 
misleading rumors. The operation of “trading pools” in the United States during the 
1920s gives examples of information-based manipulation. A group of investors would 
combine to form a pool: first to buy a stock, then to spread favorable rumors about the 
firm, and finally to sell out at a profit.4 The striking cases of Enron and the Worldcom in 
                                                        
3 For example, China's worst stock-market crime in 2002 was a scheme by seven people, 
including two former China Venture Capital executives, accused of using $700 million and 1,500 
brokerage accounts nationwide to manipulate the company share price.  
4 An example of information-based manipulation is the case of Texas Gulf Sulphur Company in 
the 1960s (Jaffe 1974). In late 1963 drillings by its engineers struck huge mineral deposits. 
Between November 1963 and mid-April 1964, company officials tried hard to convince the 
public that the opposite was true, by falsifying evidence, while accumulating company shares and 
options. On April 12, 1964, the company even issued a press release stating that the technical 
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2001 might also be related to information-based manipulation. Van Bommel (2003) 
shows the role of rumors in facilitating price manipulation. 
 
Benabou and Laroque (1992) show that if an opportunistic individual has privileged 
information and his statements are to certain extent viewed as credible by investors, he 
can profitably manipulate asset markets through strategically distorted announcements. 
As privileged information is noisy and learning remains incomplete, opportunistic 
individuals (corporate officers, financial journalists, or “gurus”) can manipulate the 
market repeatedly, even though their manipulation power is limited in the long run by 
public’s constant reassessment of their credibility. In a related article, John and 
Narayanan (1997) discuss market manipulation through inside information and the role of 
insider trading regulations. They show that the existing disclosure rule of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) creates incentives for an informed insider to 
manipulate the stock market by sometimes trading in wrong direction (i.e., buying with 
bad news and selling with good news about the firm). By doing so, the insider can 
effectively reduce the informativeness of his subsequent trade disclosure because the 
market is not sure whether an insider’s buying (selling) indicates good (bad) news. 
Consequently, the insider maintains his information superiority for a longer period of 
time and uses it to reap large profits in later periods by trading in the “right” direction. 
These profits more than make up for the losses suffered by trading in the wrong direction 
initially.5   
 
Action-based manipulation is based on actions (other than trading) that change the actual 
                                                                                                                                                                     
evidence was inconclusive; four days—and a large number of shares—later, the company 
admitted that deposits had in fact been found. Mahoney (1999), however, question the empirical 
validity of the existence of manipulation in the 1920s. 
5 In addition, Vila (1989) presents an example of information-based manipulation where the 
manipulator shorts the stock, releases false information and then buys back the stock at a lower 
price. 
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or perceived value of the assets. Bagnoli and Lipman (1996) investigate action-based 
manipulation using take-over bids. In their model, a manipulator acquires stock in a firm 
and then announces a take-over bid. This leads to a price run up of the firm’s stock. The 
manipulator therefore is able to sell his stock at the higher price. Of course, the bid is 
dropped eventually.  
 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 established extensive provisions aimed at 
eliminating manipulation. By regulating information disclosure and restricting and 
monitoring the trading activities of the directors, managers, and insiders, the Act has 
successfully made market manipulation more difficult. The types of manipulation that the 
Act effectively outlawed are mainly information-based and action-based. As a matter of 
fact, regulating information disclosure of public companies has now become one of the 
most important tasks of virtually all securities regulation bodies across the world.  
 
Trade-based manipulation, however, is much more difficult to eradicate. It occurs when a 
large trader or a group of traders attempt to manipulate the price of an asset simply by 
buying and then selling, without taking any publicly observable action to alter the asset 
value or releasing false information to change the price. This type of manipulation could 
be of great importance empirically. Hedge funds often buy and then sell substantial 
blocks of stock, even though they are apparently not interested in taking over the firm. In 
our opinion, these large buying/selling activities could be taken sometimes for the 
purpose of trade-based manipulation.  
 
Allen and Gale (1992) build a model showing that trade-based manipulation is possible in 
a rational expectations framework. The Allen and Gale model has three trading dates 
(indexed by 321 ，，=t ) and three types of traders, a continuum of identical rational 
investors, a large informed trader who enters the market at date 1 if and only if he has 
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private information, and a large manipulator who observes whether the informed trader 
has the private information. The manipulator has a small but positive probability to enter 
the market and to mimic the informed trader’s action when the informed trader actually 
has no private information. The manipulator is able to achieve a positive profit under 
certain conditions because there can exist a pooling equilibrium in which the investors 
are uncertain whether a large trader who buys shares is a manipulator or an informed 
trader.6  
 
Aggarwal and Wu (2003) present a theory and some empirical evidence on stock price 
manipulation in the United States. Extending the framework of Allen and Gale (1992), 
they consider what happens when a manipulator can trade in the presence of other 
rational traders who seek out information about the stock’s true value. In a market with 
manipulators, they show more information seekers imply a greater competition for shares, 
making it easier for a manipulator to enter the market and potentially worsening market 
efficiency. 
 
There are several other articles investigating manipulation. Camerer (1998) tests whether 
naturally occurring markets can be strategically manipulated using a field experiment 
with racetrack betting. Kumar and Seppi (1992) develop a model of manipulation in 
futures markets. Hart (1977) investigates the conditions of equilibrium price process 
under which manipulation is possible. He considers conditions under which profitable 
                                                        
6 Allen and Gale made several assumptions to make the trade-based manipulation possible in 
their model. First, the small investors must be much more risk averse than the large traders. The 
manipulation may not be possible if the informed trader is as risk averse as or even more risk 
averse than the small rational investors. Second, the probability of manipulation shall be 
sufficiently small. Third, private information still plays a crucial role in the model. Fourth, the 
informed trader’s trading decision depends on whether he receives the private information, but 
not on the content of his private information. Namely, when the informed trader receives his 
private information, he will purchase the same quantity of the stock no matter what he receives is 
good news or bad news; when he does not receive the private information, he will not enter the 
market even though he is risk neutral and the expected asset return is positive. To some extent, the 
informed trader himself seems to be less than fully rational. 
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speculation is possible in an infinite horizon deterministic economy. He finds that 
manipulation is possible if the economy is dynamically unstable or if demand functions 
are non-linear and satisfy some technical conditions. Jarrow (1992) extends Hart’s 
analysis to a stochastic setting with time dependent price process. He shows that 
profitable manipulation is possible if the manipulator can corner the market. He also 
demonstrates the manipulator can achieve a positive profit if he is able to establish a price 
trend and trade against it. To conserve space, we are sorry to skip many other important 
articles in this literature. 
 
Our investigation of manipulation is based on a different setup and generates several new 
insights. First, because our model does not rest on information asymmetry or fundamental 
risk, manipulation investigated here is therefore purely trade-based. Second, our model 
does not depend on various market frictions discussed in the literature (e.g., Jarrow 1992), 
such as corners, short squeezes, etc.  Third, and most importantly, we derive the 
equilibrium price process endogenously by constructing manipulator’s trading strategies 
based on certain well-documented behavioral biases of investors. Theoretically, the large 
trader can manipulate the price process repeatedly and frequently as long as there are 
investors who have those behavioral biases specified in the model.  
 
The contributions of our work are multi-fold. First, the paper provides an application of 
behavioral theories documented in the literature to endogenously derive several 
well-known asset pricing anomalies.  Second, we provide an additional example of 
trade-based manipulation, distinct from the model of Allen and Gale (1992)--that does 
not impose assumptions on information asymmetry or the probability of manipulation. 
Third, we illustrate a possibility of trade-based manipulation based on realistic 
assumptions about behavior that have been well documented empirically. One may view 
our paper as a companion paper of Allen and Gale (1992). They study the possibility of 
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price manipulation under rational expectations with information asymmetry while we 
provide a case of market manipulation under behavioral bias and limits to arbitrage but 
with no fundamental risk or information asymmetry. 
 
2. The Model Economy 
 
We consider a discrete-time market in which there exist a speculative asset and a riskfree 
bond. The riskfree bond yields a zero net return each period of time. There are three 
classes of investors, a manipulator, arbitrageurs, and behavior-driven traders, who buy 
and sell the speculative asset following their own rules. The characteristics of these 
investors are described in detail in the following assumptions. 
 
Assumption 1. We consider a discrete-time economy that begins at time ,0=t  and ends 
at time Tt = (namely, Tt ,,2,1,0 L= ). A continuum number of new behavior-driven 
investors, with measure 1, enter the market at the beginning of each period t. They are 
price-takers and each of them has a probability of 1q  to buy a share of the speculative 
asset if the price of the asset at time t>0, tP , is greater than the asset price at time t-1, 
1−tP . If 1−≤ tt PP , each new behavior-driven investor has a probability of 2q  to buy a 
share of the speculative asset, where 12 qq < .  
 
At the beginning of the economy, t=0, the price of the speculative asset ( 0P ) is equal to 
the fundamental value of the asset, and the behavior-driven investors are endowed with 
1q  shares of the speculative asset in total. Those investors who own the speculative asset 
at the beginning of the economy take 0P  as the initial acquiring cost per share of the 
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speculative asset. 
 
The new behavior-driven investors at time t>0 who do not buy the speculative asset 
choose to leave the market right away. The old generations of behavior-driven investors 
who entered the market before t>0 do not buy any more shares at time t. Behavior-driven 
investors like to take quick profits. They sell their shares as soon as they have made a 
profit and then leave the market. Consider a behavior-driven investor who buys a share 
of the speculative asset at time t and has not sold his share by the beginning of time 
)0( >+ kkt . If ktt PP +< , he shall liquidate his share in the period of kt +  for sure; 
if ktt PP +≥ , he will have a probability of 13 <q  to liquidate his share in the period of 
kt + . Behavior-driven investors leave the market right after they have liquidated their 
shares. 
 
This assumption is made on the basis of two important empirical observations: trend 
chasing (momentum trading) and dispositional effect.  
 
In an original article, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that the winners of the stock 
market over past several months tend to outperform in the next several months as well. 
This phenomenon is now termed as momentum and has been well documented in the 
behavioral finance literature. In the BSV model, momentum can occur because of the 
investors’ conservatism. Hong and Stein (1999), as introduced earlier, explicitly add 
momentum traders—traders buying stocks after a price increase—to their model. Many 
other researchers, including DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldermann (1990) and 
Cutler, Summers, and Poterba (1990), have also investigated momentum trading or 
positive feedback trading. The simplest way of motivating positive feedback trading is 
extrapolative expectations. Namely, as investors form expectations by extrapolating 
trends, they buy into price trends. This can be due to some important psychological biases 
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of investors, including representativeness and the law of small numbers (Barberis and 
Thaler, 2003). 
 
Robert J. Shiller (2002, p14) has the following vivid description on momentum trading or 
feedback trading: 
 
When speculative prices go up, creating successes of some investors, this may attract 
public attention, promote word-of-mouth enthusiasm, and heighten expectations for 
further price increases. … This process in turn increases investor demand, and thus 
generates another round of price increases. … The high prices are ultimately not 
sustainable, since they are high only because of expectations of further price 
increases. … 
 
The story about tulip mania in Holland in the 1630s provides us a real example on 
momentum trading with little fundamental news (Charles MacKay (1841, pp 118-119) or 
Shiller (2002, p15)): 
 
Many individuals grew suddenly rich. A golden belt hung temptingly out before the 
people, and one after another, they rushed to the tulip marts, like flies around a honey 
pot. … At last, however, the more prudent began to see that this folly could not last 
forever. Rich people no longer bought the flowers to keep them in their gardens, but to 
sell them again at cent per cent profit. It was seen that somebody must lose fearfully in 
the end. As this conviction spread, prices fell, and never rose again. 
 
Dispositional effect is another well-documented empirical phenomenon. According to 
Shefrin and Statman (1985), Odean (1998), Grinblatt and Han (2001), etc., investors, 
especially the individual ones, are more likely to sell stocks that have gone up in value 
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relative to their purchase price, rather than stocks that have gone down. Two behavioral 
explanations for the dispositional effect have been suggested in the literature. The first 
explanation suggests that investors may have a biased belief in mean-reversion. The 
second explanation relies on prospect theory and narrow framing.  
 
Assumption 2. There is a manipulator in the market who is a large market player and is 
able to influence the asset price. In other words, the manipulator is a price-setter rather 
than a price-taker. He enters the market at time 1 without any initial endowment of the 
speculative asset. At each period of time 1≥t , the manipulator sets a price target for 
that period and then submits his order to clear the market at the target price.  
 
The assumption that the manipulator is a large trader is conventional in the literature on 
trade-based manipulation. In order to move the market with strategic trading, the 
manipulator must have the power to influence the price (see Jarrow (1992) and Allen and 
Gale (1992)).  
 
Assumption 3. There is also a continuum number of arbitrageurs, with measure 1, enters 
the market at time t=1. They are price-takers and trade shares of the speculative asset 
based on recent price movements. If the price moves up in the current period, they sell 
some shares to take profits. If the price goes down, they buy. Formally, they submit the 
following orders at time t: 
( ) ( )tttta PPPD ∆−=−−= − αα 1,       (1) 
where α>0.  
 
Although the new trades of the arbitrageurs in each period only depend on short term 
price movements, the total position of the speculative asset held by the arbitrageurs, tQ , 
is negatively proportional to price deviation from fundamentals. This is because the 
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arbitrageurs have already held a portfolio of ( ) ( )011
1
11 PPPPQ t
t
j
jjt −−=−−= −
−
=
−− ∑ αα  
shares of the speculative asset at time 1−t , if they buy additional ( )1−−− tt PPα  shares 
at time t , the total position of the speculative asset held by them will be 
( )0PPQ tt −−= α  shares. The arbitrageurs play two roles in our model.  First, they 
provide necessary liquidity to the market so that trading can take place at equilibrium for 
each period. For instance, if the manipulator wants to move the asset price up by 
submitting a purchasing order, there must be some investors selling sufficient number of 
shares of the speculative asset. Because the behavior-driven investors in a sense are 
momentum followers, a new class of investors is therefore needed in the model. Second, 
our model rules out fundamental risk. The arbitrageurs’ trading strategy ensures that the 
price of speculative asset will not move away from fundamentals explosively. We call α 
arbitrage parameter and will discuss its meaning and implication further in the next 
section. 
 
Assumption 4. Although the manipulator enters the market at time 1, the market already 
existed at time 0. The price of the speculative asset at time 0 was 0P , which was equal to 
the fundamental value of the asset. There were 1q  behavior-driven investors who held 
one share of the speculative asset per person at the market close of day 0. 
 
The manipulator tends to move the asset price up by a fixed amount of 0>δ  for ut  
( 1>ut ) consecutive periods from day 1 to day ut . That is 
.,,2,1,01 utt ttPP L=>=− − δ       (2) 
By the close of day ut , the manipulator has accumulated certain number of shares of the 
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speculative asset. He starts liquidating his shares from day ut +1 and keeps doing so 
until he has sold all of his shares by time T-1 for some 1+> utT . We define 
ud tTt −−= 1  as the length of time the manipulator takes to liquidate his shares 
accumulated by time ut . 
 
In order to ensure market equilibrium for each day, δ shall satisfy certain condition as 
discussed subsequently. Assumption 4 is not the only possible assumption that can make 
manipulation profitable, but is a simple one.  
 
Assumption 5. The manipulator leaves the market right after he has sold all his shares at 
T-1. The market ends at time T and by then investors receive a liquidating dividend of 0P  
for each share of the speculative asset.  
 
Assumption 5 is not really needed for discussing the manipulation issue in the model. We 
make this assumption here following the convention in the literature and the widespread 
belief that in the long run, fundamental rules. The assumption is useful in discussing 
certain asset price anomalies such as long-term reversal. It is easy to see from 
assumptions 3 and 5 that the net purchases of arbitrageurs are zero over the whole time 
periods.  
 
Here, we assume the speculative asset has no fundamental risk. We also assume that there 
is no heterogeneous information. This does not mean that fundamental risks and 
information asymmetry are not important in the real market or in market manipulation. 
Rather, we use this simplified setup to highlight the manipulator’s trading strategies when 
the market is not fully rational. With this simple framework, we demonstrate that 
manipulation is possible even if there is no information asymmetry on asset fundamentals. 
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More importantly, using this setup, we are able to explain the speculative dynamics of the 
prices of assets (commodities) with stable fundamental value, such as the tulip mania 
mentioned above. 
 
3. Results and Interpretations 
 
To solve the model, we first find out the accumulated holding of the speculative asset by 
the manipulator at the market close by time ut . We have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: By the market close at day ut , the manipulator has accumulated 
δα ⋅⋅= utN  shares of the speculative asset with an average cost of δ

 ++
2
1
0
utP  per 
share. 
 
Proof: By Assumptions 1 to 3, it follows immediately that for each period t, such as 
utt ≤≤1 , the manipulator shall buy δα ⋅  shares at a price of δtP +0 . A simple 
calculation yields the statement in Proposition 1. ■ 
 
Proposition 1 highlights the important impact of arbitrage on the manipulator’s trading 
strategy. To move the price of the speculative asset by an amount of δ , the manipulator 
must purchase δα ⋅  shares of the asset. If α  is sufficiently large, the manipulator must 
have a very deep pocket to move the market. Put another way, when there is no limit of 
arbitrage, namely, ∞→α , it is almost impossible for the manipulator to “pump and 
dump” the speculative asset. Therefore, the assumption of the “limits of arbitrage” is 
essential for the manipulator’s trading strategy to work. Proposition 1 also suggests that, 
the higher the original price of the asset, the more money the manipulator needs to put up 
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for purchasing the shares. This implies, ceteris paribus, small cap stocks are more likely 
to be subject to price manipulation. 
 
We first consider a simple but interesting case in which behavior-driven investors are 
extremely unwilling to take losses, namely, 03 =q . This is a strong implication of the 
dispositional effect that has been supported by several empirical studies, such as Odean 
(1998) and Grinblatt and Han (2001) 
 
Proposition 2: If 03 =q , then the manipulator can sell his shares at a high price 
δutPP += 03  from time 1+= utt  through time 1−= Tt  by appropriately choosing a 
positive δ. By doing so, the manipulator’s total profit is 2
2
1
2
1 δαδ ⋅

 −⋅=

 −⋅ uuu tttN . 
The trading volume stays at 1q+αδ  shares per period from time 1=t  to time utt = . 
From time 1+= utt  to time 1−= Tt , trading volume per period is 2q  shares--the 
manipulator sells 2q  shares to new behavior-driven investors each period. 
 
Proof: Set αδ ⋅
⋅=
u
d
t
qt 2 . Because 03 =q , behavior-driven investors will not sell their 
shares without a profit. The manipulator is able to sell 2q  shares to the new 
behavior-driven investors each period from day 1+= utt  through time 1−= Tt  by 
maintaining the equilibrium price at δut tPPu += 0 . The average selling price is utP  per 
share. As a result, the manipulator’s total profit is 
2
0 2
1
2
1 δαδπ ⋅

 −⋅=

 

 ++−⋅= uuut tttPPN u     (3) 
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Now, we consider trading volume. From time 1=t  to time utt = , the price of 
speculative asset rises by δ  per time period. By assumptions, the old behavior-driven 
investors sell 1q  shares of the speculative asset while the new behavior-driven investors 
buy 1q  shares in any period t, such as utt ≤≤1 . In the mean time, the arbitrageurs sell 
αδ  shares each time period.  In order to clear the market, the manipulator has to buy 
αδ  shares. The total trading volume from time 1=t  to time utt =  is therefore 
1q+αδ  shares per period. 
 
Because the asset price remains constant from time 1+= utt  to time 1−= Tt , the 
arbitrager will not trade in this case. The old behavior-driven investors who still own the 
shares at time utt >  should have bought at the peak price δut tPPu += 0  and must not 
sell because they have not made any profits. On the other hand, the new behavior-driven 
investors choose to buy 2q  shares at time utt > . In order to clear the market, the 
manipulator has to sell 2q  shares. The total trading volume in this case is 2q  shares. 
■ 
 
Figure 1 presents the price dynamics, total trading volume and the buying/selling pattern 
of the manipulator based on Proposition 2. We use a positive number for the 
manipulator’s buying volume and a negative number for his selling volume. The steep 
rise in asset price and the purchase by the manipulator clearly demonstrates his 
“pumping” strategy, while the negative trading volume and a flat price shows the constant 
sell of his position to the behavioral investors. In the final period T=10, behavioral 
investors and arbitrageurs settle their shares at the price equal to fundamental value. The 
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manipulator is out of the market, thus there is no trading volume. 
 
Figure 1: Price Dynamics and Trading Volume when 03 =q  
(Assuming 0,4.0,8.0,1.0,3,6 321 ====== qqqtt du α ) 
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This proposition illustrates a special case in which the manipulator profits from the biases 
of behavior-driven investors who are more likely to chase a trend and are not willing to 
sell losers. In contrast, behavior investors lose money on average. The behavior-driven 
investors who enter the market at early stage can make profits but those who enter the 
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market lately surfer severe losses. The arbitrageurs in this case can make a profit because 
they shorted shares at prices higher than 0P  from time 1=t  to time utt =  and are 
able to cover their short positions at the fundamental value 0P  at the end. However, if the 
arbitrageurs had to cover their short positions before T, they might suffer a loss. Because 
12 qq < , the proposition indicates that the trading activities are more active in an up 
market than in a down market. This finding is consistent with the typical empirical 
observations. 
 
The proposition also indicates that both short-term momentum and long-term reversal 
phenomena can be generated in our behavior model even without fundamental shocks: 
The price of the speculative asset rises for several consecutive periods but moves down 
eventually.  
 
In general, when 03 >q , the situation will become more complicated. The following 
propositions illustrate several possible solutions to the model.  
 
Proposition 3: Suppose that 0312 >⋅−≡ qqqh . Then the manipulator can sell his 
shares at a high price δut tPPu += 0  from time 1+= utt  through time 1−= Tt  by 
appropriately choosing a positive ( )( )33123 qt
qqq
qt
h
uu
⋅
⋅−=⋅⋅< ααδ . By doing so, the 
manipulator’s total profit is still 2
2
1
2
1 δαδπ ⋅

 −⋅=

 −⋅= uuu tttN .The trading 
volume remains at 1q+αδ  shares per period from time 1=t  to time utt = . From time 
1+= utt  to time 1−= Tt , trading volume per period is 2q  shares and the 
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manipulator is able to sell ( ) hqh jj 131 −−≡  shares at time jtt u +=  ( 1≥j ). 
Proof: If the manipulator maintains the equilibrium price at δut tPPu += 0  from time 
1+= utt  through time 1−= Tt , the arbitrageurs will neither sell nor buy during these 
ud tTt −−= 1  periods according to Assumption 3. Assumption 1 indicates that, at time 
1+= utt , the new behavior-driven investors will buy 2q  shares in total, while the old 
behavior-driven investors will sell totally 31 qq ⋅  shares. Therefore at time 1+= utt , all 
behavior-driven investors will have a net purchase of 3121 qqqhh ⋅−≡=  shares. At 
time 2+ut , the net purchase of the speculative asset by old and new behavior-driven 
investors will be ( ) ( )hqqhqqh 33122 1−=⋅+−≡ . By the method of induction, we can 
prove that for any jtt u += , such as dtj ≤<0 , the net purchase of the speculative 
asset by all old and new behavior-driven investors will be 
( ) hqh jj 131 −−= , 
provided that the asset price is maintained at δut tPPu += 0  from time 1+= utt  
through time jtt u += . 
 
Since the arbitrageurs will not trade when the asset price is stable, the manipulator must 
sell ( ) hqh jj 131 −−=  shares at time jtt u +=  to clear the market at a price of .utP  As 
a result, the total number of shares he can sell at price 
ut
P  from time 1+= utt  through 
time 1−= Tt  equals ( ) }{ h
q
qh
dd tt
j
j ⋅−−=∑
= 3
3
1
11
. If the manipulator chooses 
( )[ ]
h
t
qq
u
td
⋅−−= αδ
3311 , then he can sell all of his shares by time 1−T . It follows 
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immediately that if T goes to infinity, then 
3qt
h
u ⋅
→ αδ .   
 
The trading volumes from time 1=t  to time utt =  can be obtained directly from the 
proof of Proposition 2. From time 1+= utt  to time 1−= Tt , because the price remains 
constant, the arbitrager will not trade while the new behavior-driven investors will buy 
2q  shares each period of time. On the other hand, our proof above shows that the old 
behavior-driven investors will totally sell jhq −2  shares at time jtt u +=  ( 1≥j ). As 
a result, the manipulator has to sell jh  shares to clear the market at time jtt u +=  
and the total trading volume at time jtt u +=  is 2q .■ 
 
Figure 2: Price Dynamics and Trading Volume when 3.03 =q  
 (Assuming 3.0,4.0,8.0,1.0,3,6 321 ====== qqqtt du α ) 
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Figure 2 presents the price dynamics, total trading volume and the buying/selling pattern 
of the manipulator based on Proposition 3. Comparing Figure 1 and 2, we can see that the 
price rise is less steep when 03 >q . The trading volume is also smaller by the 
manipulator, since in this case he needs to take into consideration the selling by 
loss-making investors. Because jj hh <+1 , Proposition 3 indicates that the manipulator’s 
speed to liquidate his shares slows down gradually. This is because as time goes by, more 
and more behavior-driven investors have accumulated some shares of the speculative 
asset and will exert higher selling pressure on the market. 
 
The condition ( )( )33123 qt
qqq
qt
h
uu
⋅
⋅−=⋅⋅< ααδ  imposed in the Proposition implies 
that the total number of shares N accumulated by the manipulator up to time ut  must be 
limited, namely ( )
3
312
3
q
qqq
q
htN u
⋅−=<= αδ , if the manipulator hopes to liquidate 
all his shares at the high price 
ut
P . This result is quite intuitive. For liquidity reason, the 
(0.40)
(0.20)
-
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Time
Vo
lu
m
e Trading
Volume
Manipulator
Purchase
 23
manipulator is not able to sell too many shares without moving the price down. The 
restriction imposed on δ or N will also impose an upper bound for the profit made by the 
manipulator following the strategy described in the Proposition  
( ) 2
3
32 11
2
1
2
1 

 ⋅−−⋅

 −⋅=⋅

 −⋅=
q
h
t
qtttt
u
t
u
u
u
u
d
ααδαπ  
( ) ( )[ ] 21
3
2
2
1
3
22
3 2
111
1
2
1 

 −⋅<

 −−−⋅

 −⋅= q
q
qq
q
qq
t
t
dt
u
u
αα .   (4) 
 
Corollary 4: The manipulator’s profit π given in Proposition 3 is a decreasing function of 
the arbitrage parameter α. In particular, when +∞→α , 0→π .  
 
Corollary 4 reemphasize the role of the “limits of arbitrage” in our manipulation model. 
The intuition is straightforward. If the arbitrageurs trade very aggressively against the 
manipulator, it will be very difficult for the manipulator to move the price up. To move 
the price up by a given amount, δutu = , by time ut , the manipulator has to accumulate 
a large portfolio of uN ⋅= α  shares of the speculative asset. This is not only a matter of 
the depth of the manipulator’s pocket as mentioned earlier. More importantly, as the 
behavior-driven investors only provide a limited net purchase of the speculative asset, it 
is impossible for the manipulator to liquidate all his shares of the speculative asset to the 
behavior-driven investors. Therefore, in a market where arbitrage is unlimited, the 
manipulator cannot be successful even if there are investors whose behaviors are biased. 
 
In terms of Proposition 3, the arbitrageurs are able to make a profit by shorting the asset 
at prices higher than the fundamental value 0P  and then covering their short positions at 
the fundamental price 0P  eventually. This means that it is not necessarily good for the 
arbitrageurs to take too aggressive actions to preventing the market price of the 
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speculative asset from deviating from its fundamental value. If the arbitrage strength 
parameter α  is too large to make manipulation possible, the arbitrageurs will lose their 
opportunities to make profit as well. 
 
Corollary 5: The manipulator’s profit π given in Proposition 3 is a decreasing function of 
3q . Provided 0312 >⋅−≡ qqqh , the profit π is also an increasing function of 2q  but a 
decreasing function of 1q . 
 
As previously mentioned, in our model, the manipulator can make a profit, to a large 
extent, due to the dispositional effect--the unwillingness of certain investors to sell losers. 
The smaller the 3q , the stronger is the dispositional effect. Moreover, it would be easier 
for the manipulator to make a profit if there are more behavioral investors who can 
provide liquidity (higher 2q ). A higher 1q  appears to be negative for manipulator 
profits, since the manipulator needs to worry more about the selling by behavioral 
investors who entered the market and bought 1q  shares at time ut  if .03 >q  In our 
model, behavioral investors cash out immediately during the price run up so momentum 
investing ( 1q ) plays little role in price determination when utt < . 
 
Proposition 6: Suppose that dt is fixed, that ( )[ ]  −−−>= 132311 qqqqtN dtuαδ , and 
that 0312 >⋅−≡ qqqh . If the manipulator prefers to maintain the price unchanged at 
ut
P  (if possible) for k ( dtk <≤0 ) periods and then let the price drop by an equal amount 
η ( 0>η ), that is η−=− −1tt PP  for 1,,1 −++= Tktt u L , one obtains: 
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(a)  
( )[ ]
( )α
αδ
η
kt
q
q
qqt
d
t
u
d
−



 −−−−
=
1
3
2
311
          (5) 
(b) The manipulator’s capital gain is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ηδαπ h
q
qqktqqtt
dd t
d
tk
u
u ⋅−−−−−−−⋅

 −⋅= 2
3
33332 111
2
1   
       
( )( ) 2
2
1 ηα +−−− ktkt dd            (6) 
The trading volume remains at 1q+αδ  shares per period from time 1=t  to time 
utt = . From time 1+= utt  to time ktt u += , trading volume per period is 2q  shares 
and the manipulator is able to sell ( ) hqh jj 131 −−≡  shares at time jtt u +=  ( kj ≤≤1 ). 
From time 1++= ktt u  to time 1−= Tt , trading volume per period is αη+2q  and 
the manipulator is able to sell ( ) αηαη +−=+ − hqh jj 131  shares at time jtt u +=  
( kj > ). 
Proof: It follows immediately that if 0312 >⋅−≡ qqqh  and >= αδutN  
( )[ ]  −−− 132311 qqqq dt , the manipulator is able to sell shares to the behavior-driven 
investors and to maintain the price unchanged at 
ut
P  for k  periods after utt = for 
some non-negative k  as long as ud tTtk −−≡< 1 . Following the proof of Proposition 
3, we obtain that if the price does not rise, the total number of shares bought by the 
behavior-driven investors minus shares sold by them from 1+= utt  through 1−= Tt  
is equal to 
( )[ ]
h
q
q dt ⋅−−
3
311 . Therefore, the manipulator must sell totally 
( )[ ]



 −−−
3
311
q
hqt
dt
uαδ  shares to the arbitrageurs. By Assumption 3, the total number 
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of shares bought from 1++= ktt u  through 1−= Tt  shall be ( )ηα ktd − . The market 
clearing condition gives part (a) of the proposition. Part (b) of the Proposition can be 
proved with tedious calculations.  
 
The trading volumes from time 1=t  to time utt =  and from time 1+= utt  to time 
ktt u +=  can be obtained directly from the proof of Proposition 3. From time 
1++= ktt u  to time 1−= Tt , the new behavior-driven investors will buy 2q  shares 
each period of time, while the old behavior-driven investors will totally sell jhq −2  
shares at time jtt u +=  ( kj > ). On the other hand, because the price drops by η each 
period of time, the arbitrager will buy αη  shares at time jtt u +=  ( kj > ). As a result, 
the manipulator needs to sell αη+jh  shares to clear the market at time jtt u +=  and 
the total trading volume at time jtt u +=  is αη+2q  ( kj > ).■ 
 
Figure 3 presents the price dynamics, total trading volume and the buying/selling pattern 
of the manipulator based on Proposition 6. The proposition demonstrates a very clear 
pattern of short-term momentum and long-term reversal. Asset price rises for several 
consecutive periods and then drops down gradually and continually after reaching the 
peak. As a matter of fact, if the size of the speculative asset accumulated by the 
manipulator by time utt =  is sufficiently large, the price is bounded to reverse its 
up-trend some day as it is impossible for the manipulator to sell his shares by maintaining 
the price at the peak level or letting the price keep rising. The differences in trading 
patterns before and after time ktt u +=  indicate that if the manipulator wants to 
liquidate his shares in a quick manner, he must accept lower selling prices. This is 
consistent with our intuition on asset liquidity. 
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Figure 3: Price Dynamics and Trading Volume when dtk <  
(Assuming 35.0,1,3.0,4.0,8.0,1.0,3,6 321 ======== δα kqqqtt du ) 
 
 
 
 
Comparing Figure 2 and 3, we can see that the initial price rise could be more steep when 
the manipulator would let the sell price to fall after time ktt u += . The trading volume 
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needs to buy more shares to push the price higher while also sell more shares to liquidate 
his position. A simple computation shows that the manipulator makes more profit by 
letting the sell price to fall after time ktt u += . 
 
Corollary 7: Consider a special case of Proposition in which 1=dt , that is, the 
manipulator needs to liquidate his shares accumulated from time 1=t  to time utt =  
quickly within one period time. One obtains:  
(a)  αδη
htu −=                 (7) 
(b) The manipulator’s capital gain is 
δδαδαπ uu tth 

 

−

−=
22
            (8) 
 
Corollary 8: In Corollary 7, the manipulator can make a profit if and only if  
( )1
2
+< ut
h
αδ .             (9) 
 
Corollary 9: Suppose that ut is fixed and that 1=dt , then the manipulator’s maximum 
profit is obtained by setting 
)1( +⋅= ut
h
αδ  (for 0>h ). By doing so, the manipulator’s 
profit is α21
2h
t
t
u
u ⋅+ . 
 
Corollaries 8 and 9 provide us a quite intuitive result. If the manipulator has to complete 
a cycle of manipulation in a quick manner, he shall not move the price too slowly as by 
doing so, he will not be able to move the price up by a significant amount. On the other 
hand, he shall not be too greedy by moving the price too rapidly either, because by doing 
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so, he will have to accumulate too large a position in the speculative asset and will not be 
able to liquidate the position at favorable prices.  
 
To provide more intuition about Proposition 6, we now consider another special case of 
the Proposition in which 1=k  and 2=dt . The following result can be obtained. 
 
Proposition 10: Suppose that 0312 >⋅−≡ qqqh . Consider a special case of 
Proposition 6 in which 1=k  and 2=dt .  One obtains: 
(a)  
( )
α
αδη hqtu 32 −−=             (10) 
(b) The manipulator can obtain a maximum trading profit by setting 
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
h
t
qh
t
q
q
t
hq
uuu ⋅
−=⋅
−−
>+
−= αααδ
33
2
3
3 2
11
1
3 .       (11) 
 
Proof: Part (a) follows immediately from Proposition 6. By the assumption, the 
manipulator shall sell h  shares at time 1+ut  and remaining htu −⋅⋅ δα  shares at 
time 2+ut . Because the average cost of the manipulator’s position in the speculative 
asset is δ
2
1−− ut tPu  per share, the manipulator’s capital gain is given by: 
( ) 

 −−−⋅⋅+⋅−= ηδδαδπ
2
1
2
1 u
u
u ththt        (12) 
With tedious calculations, one can find that 
( ) ( )[ ] uu thqt 331 −++−=∂
∂ δαδ
π          (13) 
and that 
 30
( )[ ] 012
2
<+−=∂
∂
uu ttαδ
π .           (14) 
The first order condition with respect to δ yields 
( )
( )1
3 3
+
−=
ut
hq
αδ . It is straightforward to 
verify that as 2≥ut , the inequality in (11) also holds.  This completes the proof of 
part (b). ■ 
 
Recall from Proposition 3 that 
( ) ( )
h
t
q
q
h
t
q
uu ⋅
−=⋅
−−
αα
3
3
2
3 211  is the manipulator’s optimal 
choice of δ if he wants to liquidate all his shares at the high price 
ut
P in two periods after 
ut . Inequality (11) in proposition 10 indicates that taking such a conservative position in 
the speculative asset in order to liquidate it at a very high price is not necessary the best 
choice for the manipulator if he does not have to cash in within one period. Comparing 
Proposition 10 with Corollary 9, we find that what profit the manipulator makes depends 
on how soon he needs to liquidate his position. The manipulator’s patience in the process 
of liquidation pays off.  
 
Proposition 11: If 0312 <⋅−≡ qqqh , manipulation considered in our model will not be 
profitable. 
Proof: If 0<h , the number of shares bought by the new behavior-driven investors will 
be smaller than that sold by the old behavior-driven investors whenever the price of the 
speculative asset stops rising. Therefore, when the manipulator liquidates his position, the 
behavior-driven investors as a whole will also sell. This prevents the manipulator from 
taking advantage of the irrationality of behavior-driven investors by liquidating his 
position to them at high prices.  ■ 
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Proposition 11 highlights again the importance of 3q , a measure of dispositional effect. 
Manipulation can be successful if and only if 3q  is sufficiently small, that is, the 
behavior-driven investors’ unwillingness to take a loss is sufficiently strong. The 
proposition also indicates that even if there exist irrational investors, there is still no 
guarantee that a manipulation can be successful. This result has important implications 
for financial practices. For example, in the real world, the investors’ behavior can be 
affected by many unpredictable factors and can show dramatic fluctuations from time to 
time. In other words, 3q  can be a random variable with a large variance. As a result, 
what consequence a real-world manipulation can bring is quite uncertain. If the 
manipulator miscalculates 3q  and over-estimates investors’ unwillingness to take losses, 
he may well end up with a loss.  
 
We have many ways to extend our model to allow for the randomness of price changes. 
For example, the manipulator can choose a different tδ  for each time period 
( )uttt ,,2,1 L=  instead of a fixed δ . As long as tδ  remain positive for all time periods 
( )uttt ,,2,1 L= , the results discussed in this section will be unchanged. We can also 
demonstrate that with appropriate choice of parameter values, the manipulator can make 
a profit even if he lets tδ  be negative occasionally for some ( )uttt ,,2,1 L= .and 
produces a price process that appears random but with an upward trend. As these 
extensions are straightforward, to conserve space, we will not discuss them in detail. The 
readers who are interested in these extensions can contact us directly. 
 
Extension to Bear Raid (Dump and Cover) 
 
It is worth noting that the model parameters may change over time according to different 
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market conditions. While Assumption 1 may describe the trading of behavioral investors 
during a bull market for the asset, it is conceivable that each new behvavior-driven 
investor could have a probability of 1q or 2q to short a share during a bear market. In this 
case, it is straightforward to show that we can construct an example of a “dump and 
cover” strategy by modifying Assumption 1. This is done by assuming that 
behavior-driven investors are bearish and only take short positions7 and by stating how 
the short-sellers may cover their positions as follows: 
 
A continuum number of new behavior-driven investors, with measure 1, enter the market 
at the beginning of each period t. They are price-takers and each of them has a 
probability of 1q  to short a share of the speculative asset if the price of the asset at time 
t>0, tP , is less than the asset price at time t-1, 1−tP . If 1−> tt PP , each new 
behavior-driven investor has a probability of 2q  to short a share of the speculative 
asset, where 12 qq < . 
 
The new behavior-driven investors at time t>0 who do not short the speculative asset 
choose to leave the market right away. The old generations of behavior-driven investors 
who entered the market before t>0 do not sell any more shares at time t. Behavior-driven 
investors like to take quick profits. They cover their short positions as soon as they have 
made a profit and then leave the market. Consider a behavior-driven investor who shorts 
a share of the speculative asset at time t and has not covered his share by the beginning 
                                                        
7 For example, during a bear market, when the market goes down, the investor will short 0.8 
shares ( 1q ). And when the market goes up, the investor will short 0.3 shares ( 2q ). Thus, 
12 qq < . The intuition here is that behavioral investors are bearish and follow a negative 
momentum. They will take short positions no matter what and short more shares when the market 
is down. They will only buy to cover their position. This is similar to our original set up, where 
behavioral investors are bullish. They will take long positions no matter what. They will only sell 
to liquidate their position. They buy more when market is up.  
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of time )0( >+ kkt . If ktt PP +> , he shall cover his short in the period of kt +  for 
sure; if ktt PP +≤ , he will have a probability of 13 <q  to cover his short in the period of 
kt + . Behavior-driven investors leave the market right after they have covered their 
shorts. 
 
To conserve space, we will not provide parallel proofs of Propositions 1-10.8 The 
intuitions are quite similar. What make this bear raid possible are the investors’ 
behavioral biases and the limit of arbitrage. Just as before, the manipulator can profit 
from his strategic trading by establish a large short position of the speculative asset while 
pushing asset price down, and then cover his position at low prices to take profits.  The 
dispositional effect plays a critical role in making profitable manipulation possible. 
Because of this effect, the speed of price rise when the manipulator buys will be slower 
than that of price decline when the manipulator shorts.  For simplicity, we will only 
discuss the case of “pump and dump” for the rest of the paper. 
 
The introduction of this paper has briefly discussed the behavior finance literature. The 
behavioral or psychological biases discussed here are shown to generate both the 
incentives and the ability of the smart money to manipulate asset prices through strategic 
buying and selling. Our result suggests that as long as there are a significant number of 
irrational traders, market manipulation may occur. 
                                                        
8 For example, one can easily show Proposition 2 holds by setting: 02 <⋅
⋅= αδ u
d
t
qt . Because 
03 =q , behavior-driven investors will not cover their shorts without a profit.  The manipulator 
is able to buy 2q  shares from the new behavior-driven investors each period from day 
1+= utt  through time 1−= Tt  by maintaining the equilibrium price at δut tPPu += 0 . The 
average selling price is 
ut
P  per share. The manipulator’s total profit is 2
2
1 δαπ ⋅

 −⋅= uu tt  
Note here that ut  actually stands for the time period the asset price is being pushed downwards. 
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4. Other Implications of the Model 
 
Our model not only provides a new and distinctive example of manipulation, but also 
sheds light on the cross-section of asset returns as well as some well-known asset pricing 
anomalies such as excess volatility, short-term momentum, and long-term reversal. 
 
Shiller (1981, 1989) and Le Roy and Porter (1981) suggest that the historical volatility of 
stock prices in the United States are simply too high to be justified by the fundamental 
variations. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) argue that the high volatility of the stock 
market can possibly be caused by changing risk aversion of the investors. They propose a 
habit formation framework in which changes in consumption relative to habit lead to 
changes in risk aversion and hence the volatility of asset returns. In out model, the 
fundamental value of the speculative asset does not change at all. However, as the large 
trader move the price with his strategic trading, the price goes up and down from time to 
time for no fundamental reason. 
 
Short-term momentum and long-term reversal are the other two popular empirical 
phenomena, as introduced in the previous sections.  
 
BSV build a model that incorporates two updating biases, conservatism (the tendency to 
underweight new information relative to priors) and representativeness (the law of small 
numbers) to explain these phenomena. When a company announces surprisingly good 
earnings, conservatism means that investors react insufficiently and therefore prices will 
drift up subsequently. After a series of good news, though, representativeness causes 
people to overreact and pushes the price up too high.  
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DHS stress biases (overconfidence) in the interpretation of private, rather than public 
information. If the private information is positive, overconfidence means that investors 
will push prices up too high relative to fundamentals. Future public information will 
gradually pull prices back to their true value, leading to long-term reversals. To get 
momentum, DHS assume that public information alters the investors’ confidence in an 
asymmetric fashion, a phenomenon known as self-attribution bias. Public news that 
confirms the investors’ private information strongly increases their confidence in the 
private information. Disconfirming public news, though, is largely ignored, and the 
investors’ confidence in the private information remains unchanged. This asymmetric 
reaction means that initial overconfidence is on average followed by even greater 
overconfidence, generating momentum. 
 
Hong and Stein (1999) assume that private information diffuses slowly through the 
population of news watchers, since news watchers are unable to extract each others’ 
information from prices, the slow diffusion means that the private information is not fully 
priced in an immediate way, generating momentum. On the other hand, momentum 
traders buy into price trend, which preserves momentum, but also generate price reversals. 
Since momentum traders do not know the extent of news diffusion, they keep buying into 
price trend even after the price has reached fundamental value, generating an 
overreaction that is reversed in the long run. 
 
In our model, there exist both price momentum and reversal because the manipulator 
keeps buying the speculative asset initially, pushing the price up period by period; he then 
keeps selling to make profits, pushing the price down.  The presence of momentum 
traders and the limits of arbitrage allows the manipulator to establish a price momentum 
while the existence of loss aversion and short-term arbitrageurs gives the manipulator a 
chance to sell at a profit even when the price is coming down. 
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Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) document that there is a significant cross-sectional 
difference in momentum across different stocks. Small cap stocks usually show strong 
momentum, but large cap stocks do not9. The result of this paper is consistent with their 
finding. In this paper, as in Jarrow (1992), a large trader can be a manipulator because he 
has the power to affect (manipulate) the price. Obviously, it is much easier for someone 
to manipulate a small cap stock than to manipulate a large cap stock. Therefore, the price 
momentum and reversal generated by manipulation shall be more prominent for small 
cap stocks. One may also argue that higher transaction cost for small stocks would limit 
arbitrage, leading to easier price manipulation. However, higher transaction cost would 
also deter momentum trading. Thus, the effect of transaction cost on price manipulation is 
somewhat ambiguous. 
 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) use a model of investor overconfidence that produces 
correlations among prices, turnover, and volatility. Their basic insight is that when 
investors have heterogeneous beliefs about the value of a stock and short sales are costly, 
the ownership of a share of the stock provides an opportunity (option) to profit from other 
investors' over-valuation. They show that the resale option leads to high speculative 
trading volume and contributes a speculative component to stock prices. In addition, 
fluctuations on the option value add to stock price volatility.  
 
In our model, the manipulative trading by the large investor lures momentum traders into 
the market, pushes the stock price up and generates price volatility. Thus, our model 
implies that volume is higher in an up market (when asset price rises) than in a down 
market. Our model also suggests that volume is positively correlated with volatility (a 
                                                        
9 Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2003) argue that this phenomenon is actually a price effect related 
to trading costs.  
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high δ means a high volatility).10 The difference between our model and that of 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) is that their model needs some news about asset 
fundametals while ours is purely based on market manipulation. This feature helps us 
understand why asset prices sometimes fluctuate continually without seemingly to have 
any news on earnings or other fundamentals. It is important to note that, without 
observing the manipulator’s trades, it will be quite hard to distinguish manipulative 
trading from speculative trading by using data only on price and trading volume. The 
only clue that might help investors detect the presence of manipulation is excessive 
trading volume and price movement without news on fundamentals. 
 
5. Empirical Support of Our Model 
 
While market manipulation has been extensively covered by the popular press, few 
academic studies have empirically examined the issue. The difficulty lies in the fact that 
the activity is often unobservable because of its secrecy. Several recent studies, however, 
have used data on government prosecution or firm-level trading data to document the 
existence of market manipulation. Their studies have lent some empirical support to our 
model.  
 
Aggarwal and Wu (2003) provide evidence from SEC actions in cases of stock 
manipulation. They find that more illiquid stocks are more likely to be manipulated and 
manipulation increases stock volatility. They show that stock prices rise throughout the 
manipulation period and then fall in the post-manipulation period. More importantly, they 
demonstrate that stock display higher trading volume, higher price appreciation, and 
                                                        
10 In some cases, our model may also produce comparable correlations among prices, turnover, 
and volatility to Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). A simple computation would show that the 
correlations between price and trading volume are positive in all three figures in section 3. The 
difference between our model and that of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) is that their model 
explicitly derives a positive correlation between price LEVEL and volume. 
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higher volatility during the manipulation period. These results are consistent with some 
assumptions as well as the main results of this paper. They suggest that stock market 
manipulation may have important impacts on asset pricing. 
Using a unique daily trade level data set from the main stock market in Pakistan, 
Khwaja and Mian (2003) distinguish between trades done by brokers on their own behalf 
and those done as intermediaries for outside investors. They find that brokers earn at least 
8% higher returns on their own trades. While neither market timing nor liquidity 
provision offer sufficient explanations for this result, they find compelling evidence for a 
specific trade-based “pump and dump” price manipulation scheme. The price patterns 
generated by such “pump and dump” is quite consistent with those described in section 3, 
where a manipulator with deep pocket use trade-based schemes to fool behavioral 
investors.  
All the above results suggest that manipulation could cause large price distortions 
in the market and thus it is a legitimate target for government regulation. They find that 
potentially informed parties such as corporate insiders, brokers, underwriters, large 
shareholders and market makers are likely to be manipulators. Aggarwal and Wu suggest 
government regulation should discourage manipulation while encouraging greater 
competition for information. 
Khwaja and Mian (2003), however, argue that the implementation of these market 
regulations will not be easy, since these rules aimed reducing manipulation will be 
actively resisted by brokers because of the sizable manipulation rents extracted by 
brokers from such schemes.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
It is now widely believed that investors are not fully rational. If so, what can the smart 
money do? This paper provides an example in which smart money can strategically take 
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advantage of investors’ behavioral biases and manipulate price process to make profit.  
It builds a model in which there are three types of traders, behavior-driven investors who 
have two major behavioral biases, momentum trading and the tendency to sell winners 
rather than losers, arbitrageurs, and a manipulator who can influence asset prices. It 
shows that due to the investors’ behavioral biases and the limit of arbitrage, the 
manipulator can profit from his strategic trading by accumulating the speculative asset 
while pushing asset price up, and then selling the asset to take profits.  The dispositional 
effect plays a critical role in making profitable manipulation possible. Because of this 
effect, the speed of price decline when the manipulator sells will be slower than that of 
price rise when the manipulator buys. 
 
Conventional wisdom suggests that smart money’s speculation tends to make the market 
efficient by offsetting the foolishness of some investors. The efficient market theory, as it 
is commonly expressed, asserts that when irrational optimists buy an asset, smart money 
sells; when irrational pessimists sell an asset, smart money buys, thereby eliminating the 
effect of the irrational traders on asset price and preventing asset price from deviating 
from its fundamental value. This paper provides a shocking counterexample. Smart 
money may create “market inefficiency”, by driving asset prices away from their 
fundamental value, rather than forcing asset prices to converge to their fundamental 
values. This possibility poses a new challenge. As the manipulator relies on neither inside 
information nor visible actions (other than trading), his manipulation is difficult to be 
detected and ruled out.  
 
Our investigation is preliminary in nature and many directions for future research remains 
open. For example, one can consider a more complicated and more realistic case in which 
the large trader can have both privileged information and market moving power. With this 
setup, manipulation is possible and more realistic because irrational investors cannot 
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rationally figure out whether the large trader’s trading is based on his private information 
or simply based on his manipulation scheme. One can also consider an extension of the 
current model in which the manipulator’s trading strategy is endogenously determined 
based on profit optimization. This extension is interesting because we can learn more 
about the price dynamics.   
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